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Technology transitions are essential to transforming air traffic management to meet future
capacity needs. Encouraging and obtaining equipage adoption is one crucial aspect of technology
transitions. We propose an approach for developing appropriate strategies to persuade aviation
stakeholders to transition to new technologies. Our approach uses cost, benefit, and value
distribution across stakeholders and over time to determine which strategies are most appropriate
to persuading aircraft operators to adopt new equipage. Equipage that may show an overall
positive value can nevertheless fail to provide value to individual stakeholders. Such imbalances in
value distribution between stakeholders or over time may lead to stakeholder intransigence and
can stymie efforts to transform air traffic management systems. Leverage strategies that correct
these imbalances and accelerate the realization of value for all stakeholders can enhance
cooperation and increase the likelihood of a successful transition to the new technology. We
demonstrate the application of the approach using the case of automatic dependent surveillance-
broadcast (ADS-B). The approach is also applicable to a wide range of industries beyond aviation,
such as the energy sector and telecommunications.
Keywords: Incentives, value distribution, cost-benefit analysis, aviation
1 Introduction
Air traffic in the United States is expected to double or triple by 2025. This increase in traffic is
expected to have many ramifications, including environmental effects, increasing flight delays, and
cancellations as traffic approaches the national airspace (NAS) capacity. Several approaches have
been developed to increase capacity, such as adding runways and spacing aircraft more closely in
en-route or terminal airspace. Other approaches involve changing the way that air traffic
management is performed. These approaches often involve some kind of technology transition,
which may require new hardware or software on the ground or in the air. In this paper we refer to
hardware on aircraft, or avionics, as equipage. For example, Automatic Dependent Surveillance-
Broadcast (ADS-B) technology has been proposed as a key enabling technology for closer aircraft
spacing, which allows more aircraft in a given airspace region. The ADS-B system consists of
ground stations and equipage and also uses GPS and other satellite services. Successful transition
to ADS-B therefore requires that ground stations be deployed across the United States and that a
majority of aircraft using the NAS adopt the necessary equipage.
Previous technology transitions in the air transport system have been a mixture of failure and
success. Loran (LOng RAnge Navigation) uses land-based radio navigation transmitters to provide
airspace users with position and timing information. The FAA was initially not interested but
airlines equipped anyway because Loran offered significant immediate benefits. Similarly, airlines
rapidly equipped their North Atlantic fleets with new altimeters in order to make use of reduced
vertical separation minimum (RVSM). The fleet of aircraft that fly North Atlantic routes is
relatively small and dedicated with aircraft generally flying over the Atlantic twice a day. Airlines
that equipped were immediately able to fly at more optimal and less congested flight levels and
2thus realized a rapid return on investment. Conversely, the transition to Controller-Pilot Datalink
Communication (CPDLC), though successful in Europe, has been shelved in the United States. The
project was over-budget and behind schedule due to inadequate initial resource allocation. In an
effort to address these problems, the features of the system were scaled back, resulting in a system
with high cost (to airlines) but limited features. Airlines were therefore reluctant to invest and the
project had to be shelved.
In this paper we begin by developing a framework for analyzing the value of technology transitions
to different aviation stakeholders. It is important to understand the value of equipage to each
stakeholder group—the adoption of equipage may be a high value proposition to one stakeholder
group but a losing proposition to other stakeholders. Next, we develop an approach to selecting
appropriate leverage strategies to encourage aviation stakeholders to participate in such transitions.
In particular, we focus on approaches to encouraging aircraft operators to adopt new equipage
necessary for technology transitions. We illustrate the use of the approach with an extensive
example based on the problem of persuading aircraft operators to install the necessary ADS-B
equipment on their aircraft.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the value analysis
framework. Section 3 shows how appropriate leverage strategies can be selected based on value
distribution across stakeholders and over time. Section 4 demonstrates the use of the value analysis
framework and the leverage selection approach using the case of ADS-B.
2 Value Analysis
In this section we develop an approach to evaluating the costs and benefits of proposed technology
transitions to different stakeholder groups. The value analysis is used as a basis for identifying
appropriate strategies for transitioning to a new technology, as discussed in Section 3. We define
both benefits and costs broadly. Benefits include both those benefits that are quantifiable, such as
reduced block times, and those that are not easily quantifiable, such as fulfillment of agency
missions. Costs include direct monetary costs as well as indirect costs and unquantifiable costs
such as loss of public trust following transition failures. For example, transitioning to a new
technology may have environmental as well as the obvious direct (e.g., equipment cost) and
indirect financial expenses (e.g., installation downtime).Value is the net benefit, or benefits less
costs over the lifetime of the equipage, of adopting.
2.1 Value Distribution
The total value across all stakeholders of a proposed technology transition may be positive, but this
does not guarantee that individual stakeholders will derive value from the transition. Some
stakeholders may reap a disproportionate share of the benefits, while others may incur a
disproportionate share of the costs. Stakeholders who are asked to bear a disproportionate share of
costs while reaping little benefit may be expected to be reluctant or unwilling to cooperate with a
technology transition effort. Ensuring a successful technology transition therefore requires looking
at the cost and benefit distribution among stakeholders, as shown in Figure 1. Filled-in circles in
the figure indicate that a particular stakeholder derives a particular benefit, or incurs a particular
cost. Thus, the first stakeholder (stk1), derives benefits 1 through m, but incurs no costs. The figure
shows a case of value imbalance: the first stakeholder (stk1) reaps the majority of benefits, and the
nth stakeholder (stkn) bears the majority of the costs. The n
th stakeholder may therefore be unwilling
to invest in the technology transition. Looking at costs and benefits in this way can reveal
imbalances in how they are distributed and help us to identify appropriate leverage studies and
3effective policies. It is important to perform this type of analysis early in the development process
when imbalances can be addressed proactively in order to avoid conflict later in development.
b1(t)
b2(t)
bm(t)
stk1 stk2 stkn
Benefits
c1(t)
c2(t)
cm(t)
stk1 stk2 stkn
Costs
n How are costs and benefits distributed between 
stakeholders?
Looking at costs and benefits in this way can reveal 
imbalances in how they are distributed
Figure 1: Example cost and bene it distribution across st keholders
The distribution of costs and benefits can be examined at different levels in order to identify the
appropriate strategies at each level. For example, in the case of aviation, the distribution of value
between the public, aircraft operators, and aviation agencies can be examined to identify high level
strategies for transitioning to the new technology. Looking at value distribution at lower levels
(e.g., value distribution among airlines) is useful for developing incentives tailored to specific
airlines.
2.2 Phased Value Analysis
When examining the distribution of value across stakeholders, it is not sufficient to merely look at
total costs and benefits. It is also necessary to examine how value is distributed over time or
implementation phases of a project. In particular, a positive long-term net present value (NPV) is
necessary but may not be sufficient to motivate investment by aircraft operators. For example,
commercial airline boards typically require a positive return on investment (ROI) within eighteen
months of investing.
The value analysis shows how costs and benefits accrue over implementation phases for different
stakeholders, as shown in Figure 2 for a single stakeholder. Stakeholders are more likely to
cooperate if benefits outweigh costs in each phase as well as over the total lifetime of the
technology or project. Thus, for aircraft operators, each phase should show a positive business case
[Allen, 1996]. The government follows a similar approach when considering investments of public
money. Instead of ROI, government investments are typically judged for how much they contribute
to accomplishing stated national and agency goals, and maintaining equity among stakeholders.
bi(t) ci(t)
implementation
phase
1 2 3 1 2 3 implementation
phase
Uncertainty
in benefits
Uncertainty
in costs
Figure 2: Phased value analysis
4Figure 2 illustrates another aspect of the value analysis: uncertainty in costs and benefits. While the
nominal case may show a net benefit, uncertainties in costs or benefits can lead to less optimistic
results. Uncertainties may be significant for new technologies adoptions. For example, the
technology may not perform as expected, or it may cost more than estimated. If the uncertainty in
costs (increasing costs) or benefits (decreasing benefits) is large, stakeholders are less likely to
invest in a technology. Making a credible case to stakeholders requires that these uncertainties and
the risks to cost and benefit realization be clearly identified, highlighted and mitigated.
3 Leverage Strategy to Encourage Technology Transition
The value analysis of a technology transition1 may reveal imbalances in value distribution across
stakeholders or over time. Such imbalances may make stakeholders unwilling to participate in the
technology transition. If policy makers determine that the overall value of a transition is compelling
and must therefore proceed, it is necessary to find ways to overcome stakeholder reluctance. One
way of encouraging cooperation is to reduce or overcome value imbalances so that all stakeholders
derive value from a transition. In this section, we develop an approach to selecting appropriate
levers to address such value imbalances.
The question of developing appropriate strategies to encourage change in the air transportation
industry has been addressed mainly from an environmental perspective. For example, there is a
substantial literature on the use of emissions trading to encourage a reduction in aviation emissions
[e.g., Carlsson and Hammar, 2002]. Aviation agencies have used a variety of measures to
encourage transition to new technologies. For example, phase-outs of stage 2 aircraft is mandated
by the FAA. Golaszewski [2003] discusses strategies for aircraft equipage from the point of view
of airline investment decisions. However, there is little formal research on the use of incentives and
other techniques to encourage transition to new technologies in the air transportation area.
Our focus in this paper is on encouraging equipage adoption by aircraft operators because their
reluctance to adopt new equipage is often a limiting factor in technology transitions. The
framework is however easily applied to all stakeholder groups.
3.1 Types of Levers
Stakeholders can be expected to be reluctant to invest in new technology if costs are high or if they
have a perception that benefits are limited, doubtful, may be delayed, short-lived, or if it is possible
to derive benefits without installing equipage (free rider option). Conversely, stakeholders will be
more likely to invest in new technology if benefits are rapid, clear, long-lived, and there is no free-
rider option.
There are four general approaches to encouraging equipage: (1) proactive infrastructure and
standards, processes, and certification development, (2) the features of the technology make it
desirable without further action, (3) positive incentives such as discounts and exclusive services,
and (4) equipage mandates and punitive approaches such as exclusion from certain airports. Figure
3 shows the value determinants of adopting equipage. The benefits of equipping are determined by
the features of the equipage itself and the services offered by the relevant aviation agencies. The
costs associated with equipping include the costs of acquiring and installing the equipment and any
service fees that are imposed by aviation agencies. We identified the levers by looking at ways of
                                                      
1 We assume that the overall value of the technology transition has been determined to be positive.
5increasing each source of benefit or decreasing each source of cost. For example, financing and
incentive schemes can be used to decrease costs and therefore increase total value. Mandates may
include extra service fees for unequipped aircraft and indirectly affect benefits through network
effects. The next sections describe in detail how each approach affects the value of equipage.
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Figure 3: Leverage strategy identification
In general, in cases where the technology does not sell itself equally to all stakeholders, a
combination of the other three approaches will be needed. Eurocontrol successfully implemented
the cockpit pilot datalink control (CPDLC) by a combination of such approaches in the Link 2000+
program [Hughes, 2005]. The agency began by offering financial aid to the first one hundred
aircraft that installed the necessary software. Financial aid was coupled with active involvement in
the development of the necessary technology and deployment of ground infrastructure. This
approach demonstrated the usefulness of the technology to airspace users. Eurocontrol is currently
developing a second phase of incentives to ensure sufficient adoption rates by 2009, when CPDLC
ground systems are due for deployment across continental Europe. At present Eurocontrol is
pushing for a CPDLC mandate coupled with the scheduled continental deployment. Older aircraft
will be given a grace period until 2014 before retrofitting is mandated.
Figure 4 illustrates how the four approaches are interrelated. Infrastructure and development
support is the basis on which the other three approaches build. Without this support any adoption
effort is likely to fail. Consider now each type of lever more closely.
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Figure 4: Levers to Encourage Adoption
3.1.1 Infrastructure and Development Support
The first step in ensuring successful equipage adoption is ensuring that the equipage and associated
services are available. For example, certification processes for the new equipage should be in place
and the necessary ground equipment (e.g., ground stations for ADS-B) must be deployed in a
timely manner so that equipped aircraft can start using their new equipage immediately.
Pioneer schemes are a special case of development support. Government agencies may decide to
fund initial installations of equipage on a subset of aircraft from one or more commercial airlines or
from the general aviation community to facilitate testing and development of equipage and the
related air traffic control procedures. This approach enlists aircraft operators as partners in the
transition process and can help build stronger ties between aviation stakeholders. For example,
under the Capstone program, UPS partnered with the Federal Aviation Agency (FAA) in Alaska to
develop and implement ADS-B equipage. Partnerships do not guarantee success however, as
evidenced by the cancellation of the CPDLC project despite initial successful collaboration
between the FAA and American Airlines.
3.1.2 Persuasive Technology Value
In some cases the technology itself may provide sufficient benefits at low enough costs to make a
strong business case to aircraft operators without the need for further incentives or mandates. For
example, by installing RVSM compliant altimeters aircraft operators gained immediate access to
more efficient and less congested flight levels. In such cases aviation agencies have only to ensure
that the necessary ground infrastructure and standards and procedures are in place to allow
implementation and use of the equipage.
Stakeholders’ perception of the value of a technology transition is partly driven by the functionality
of the new technology, which takes three general forms. First, the technology may be necessary for
the continuation of an existing service. For example, it may be necessary to install new equipage to
interface with the replacements for obsolete ground equipment. In this case, the value of equipping
may not be readily apparent to aircraft operators. By refusing to equip, operators may be able to
both avoid cost and force aviation agencies to continue maintaining the old equipment. Second, the
technology may provide an improvement in an existing service. For example, adding a display unit
to existing ADS-B ability allows pilots to monitor air traffic in their vicinity. Third, the technology
7may provide access to a new service. For example, installing improved altimeters allowed aircraft
operators to make use of reduced vertical separation minimum (RVSM) standards and gain use of
new flight levels. If we assume equal cost and value distribution for different possible technology
transitions, improved or additional services generally provide a more persuasive benefit case.
3.1.3 Positive Incentives
Where equipage does not offer significant technology value alone to a particular stakeholder,
incentives can be used to increase the effective value of equipping. Positive incentives can be
divided into four general categories. First, service discounts may be offered to aircraft that are
equipped with the new equipage. This option would be difficult to implement by the FAA because
users are not charged on a per-use basis. Agencies that do charge on a per-use basis may find this
option a powerful lever because it directly affects the business case for equipage from the aircraft
operator’s point of view. Second, equipped aircraft may be granted special access. In the case of
the transition to RVSM, aircraft equipped with the necessary altimeters gained access to previously
unavailable, and on occasion more optimal, flight levels. Third, the equipage may be used to
provide additional service. In the case of ADS-B, the FAA has proposed offering traffic and
weather information services free of charge to equipped general aviation aircraft. Finally, financing
schemes can be used to postpone, spread, decrease or limit the cost of equipping.
Several approaches to financing have been proposed and summarized in the 2002 aerospace
commission report [Walker, 2002]. The most extensive suggestion is that the federal government
provide full funding for system-critical airborne equipment. The commission argued that the total
cost to the government of fully financing the communication, navigation, and other airborne
equipment required for a next-generation ATM network would be less than the costs to the
economy arising from system delays and inefficiencies. One lower cost option for the government
is to partially fund the initial cost of equipage by vouchers or tax incentives. However, tax
incentives are unlikely to be effective when aircraft operators are not making a profit. Another
lower cost option is for the government to offer to pay for initial investments with repayment only
required if the equipage shows a minimum benefit to the aircraft operator. Finally, auctioned
investment credits could be used to motivate initial adoption by a limited number of users and
simultaneously use market forces to determine the minimum level of federal support needed.
3.1.4 Mandates and Fees
Mandates are the final approach to obtaining equipage adoption. Mandates can be complete, i.e.,
unequipped aircraft are not allowed in any controlled airspace, or more selective, requiring
equipage for operation in specific airspace classes or for access to specific regions or airports. They
can also be applied only to certain classes of aircraft. For example, commercial airlines are required
to equip their aircraft with traffic collision and avoidance systems (TCAS) but general aviation
aircraft are not. A less extreme approach is to charge a surcharge for unequipped aircraft. Like
mandates, this surcharge can be applied selectively to airspace classes, regions or airports, or
aircraft classes. This option may be difficult to implement in countries like the United States where
the FAA budget is appropriated by Congress. Aviation agencies in other countries (e.g., EU states,
Australia) that collect user fees typically have more flexibility with fee and discount structures.
Mandates and rulemaking tend to be slow and must be tailored to the lowest common denominator
[Walker, 2002]. When aircraft operators and other aviation stakeholders are resistant to mandates
they may lobby to fight or slow the mandate effort. When mandates are enacted, the worst case
scenario has aircraft operators and aviation agencies waiting for the other party. When the mandate
8deadline arrives, there is a rush to deploy ground infrastructure and equip. This process tends to be
inefficient and more costly for all parties.
Mandates have been most successful when they are related to safety. Successful safety mandate
efforts include ground proximity warning sensors (GPWS), extended ground proximity warning
sensors (EGPWS), and traffic collision and avoidance systems (TCAS).
3.2 Leverage Strategy Selection
The appropriate leverage strategies depend on the network effects of how benefits are realized, the
relative timing of costs and benefits, the value of the equipage, and the uncertainty in costs and
benefits, as shown in Figure 5. The structure of the leverage strategy, that is, the appropriate
combination of lever types, is determined by the benefit network effects, cost-benefit timing, and
cost-benefit uncertainty, as discussed below.
The extent of the leverage strategy, that is, how many resources should be expended, or the extent
of punitive measures and mandates, is determined by the overall value of the transition to the
stakeholder under consideration (e.g., aircraft operator) and to the public. Here the term “public”
includes air passengers, the aviation industry, and airport communities, as well as the general
public. All else being equal, equipage that offers significant value to aircraft operators is more
likely to be adopted without further incentives or mandates than equipage that offers lower value.
Thus the required extent of incentives, support and mandates increases as the lifetime value of
equipage decreases. The cost of equipage relative to the aircraft in which they are installed is
important. Equipage that costs $10,000 may be a negligible investment for commercial airlines but
prohibitively expensive for general aviation pilots. Thus general aviation stakeholders may require
stronger incentives than commercial airlines. Aircraft operators incur several costs in addition to
the cost of the equipment itself when adopting new equipage. These costs include installation,
training of pilots and technicians, and the lost revenue as a result of downtime for installation.
Equipage that can be installed during minor maintenance checks is more likely to be viewed
favorably by aircraft operators. In the extreme case where new equipage offers a significant benefit
to the public, but is prohibitively expensive for aircraft operators, the government could choose to
fund the cost of equipage to the extent that a positive business case emerges for the operators.
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Figure 5: Overall Leverage Strategy Selection
All other factors being equal, uncertain value decreases the attractiveness of equipage, even if the
nominal value is significant. That is, the expected value of an investment is lower in the presence
of uncertainty than when there is no uncertainty. The appropriate leverage strategy in this case
depends on the source of the uncertainty. Uncertainty related to the performance of new
technologies can be reduced by allowing the technology to mature further. Allowing the
technology to mature further through additional research or increased validation and verification
can reduce uncertainty related to the performance of new technologies. The negative effect of cost
uncertainty can be reduced by means of financing schemes that buffer aircraft operators against
cost increases. This approach of course does not remove the cost uncertainty, but merely shifts it
onto the financiers and agencies.
In the next paragraphs we discuss how benefit network effects and value timing determine the
appropriate combination of strategies.
3.2.1 Leverage Strategies According to Benefit Network Effects
Benefit network effects refers to how the benefits of equipage to a particular aircraft scale with the
number of equipped aircraft or the extent of ground infrastructure. Figure 6 shows representative
cases of how individual user benefits scale with the number of equipped aircraft. Note that these
scenarios ignore other mechanisms, such as bandwidth congestion, that could lead to a loss of
benefits. The ADS-B example discusses this type of situation further.
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Figure 6: Benefit network effects for an individual aircraft as a function of number of equipped
aircraft
The first graph in Figure 6 represents cases where benefits are independent of the number of
equipped aircraft. For example, the ADS-B package for general aviation includes weather and
traffic information services. Receiving these services does not require that other aircraft be
equipped. The second graph represents cases where there is an immediate benefit to an individual
equipped user and additional benefits are realized when more aircraft equip. For example, CPDLC
allows equipped aircraft to immediately reduce voice traffic. As more aircraft equip, CPDLC will
enable improved traffic management leading to an increase in airspace capacity. The third graph
represents cases where equipped aircraft have an initial advantage which decreases as more aircraft
equip. For example, initial adopters of RVSM equipment gained access to relatively empty flight
levels. As more aircraft equip, the flight levels will fill up, thus decreasing the initial advantage.
The initial benefit of access to more optimal flight levels remains however. Lastly, the fourth graph
represents cases where a threshold equipage level is necessary before benefits can be realized. For
example, ADS-B does not offer a significant benefit to “lone” individual commercial airline
aircraft because they already have access to weather and traffic information. The benefit of reduced
separation only becomes possible when a certain minimum number of aircraft are equipped.
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Figure 7: Benefit network effects with number of ground stations
Figure 7 shows representative cases of how benefits scale with the extent of ground infrastructure.
The first graph represents cases such as TCAS where ground equipment is not needed. The second
graph represents cases where aircraft operators derive an immediate benefit from the equipage and
where the installation of ground infrastructure delivers additional benefits. For example, general
aviation pilots derive immediate benefit from ADS-B enabled weather and traffic information. This
benefit increases as more ground stations are installed. The third case where benefit decreases with
number of ground stations is assumed not to occur. Finally, the last graph represents cases where a
threshold level of ground infrastructure is required before benefits can be realized. For example,
the reduced separation benefits of ADS-B only become possible once at least one ground stations is
deployed in a particular aircraft’s operating region. Note that as illustrated by the ADS-B example
the same system may exhibit different benefit network effects depending on stakeholder
perspective.
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Now consider the most appropriate strategies for each possible combination of equipage adoption
and ground deployment, as shown in Figure 8. For simplicity we assume that both the short term
and lifetime value to the aircraft operators of equipping is positive. The next section shows how
value delivery timing affects the determination of appropriate leverage strategies. The first three
cases reflect situations when benefits to operators can be realized with minimal or no ground
infrastructure. In these cases immediate ground deployment is not essential. In the first case where
individual adoptions result in immediate benefits, little action other than ensuring that procedure
and equipage certification are in place is required from government agencies. In the second case
where benefits deteriorate over time, aircraft operators still have an incentive to equip, assuming
that the steady-state benefits still result in a positive cost-benefit case. In the third case where a
threshold level of aircraft equipage adoptions is needed, pioneer and incentive schemes can be used
to obtain the necessary initial adoption levels. In the fourth and fifth cases, a threshold level of
ground infrastructure deployment is needed. Aviation agencies should lead the way by deploying at
least the minimum level of ground infrastructure. In the fourth case where operators derive
immediate benefit once infrastructure is deployed, operators can be expected to equip on their own
given a positive value case. Finally, in the fifth case where a threshold level of aircraft equipage
adoptions is also needed, aviation agencies should couple the deployment of ground infrastructure
with pioneer schemes and positive incentives.
In each case mandates and other punitive approaches should only be considered once the benefits
of the technology have been convincingly demonstrated. It may be possible to obtain the necessary
levels of initial equipage without resorting to mandates. In cases where both the need for and the
effectiveness of particular equipage has been demonstrated, early mandates may be a way of
“leveling the playing field” between competing aircraft operators and obtaining rapid and pervasive
equipage adoption. In the longer term, it will usually be necessary to issue forward fit mandates
followed by retrofit mandates to ensure that legacy ground systems need not be maintained.
3.2.2 Leverage Strategies According to Value Distribution over Time
The discussion of strategies according to benefit network effects assumed that the equipage
delivered both short and long term value. Consider now the effect of the timing of equipage value
delivery. Figure 9 illustrates a notional case of costs and benefits over time. Investments in
equipage are more attractive if benefits are rapidly realized. That is, in addition to a total positive
net present value (NPV), a positive NPV over the short term is preferable, especially when initial
costs are high. The short-term NPV can be increased by delaying costs or accelerating benefits.
Costs can be delayed by means of financial tools (see Section 3.1.3) such as tax incentives and
vouchers. Benefit realization can be accelerated by rapidly deploying ground equipment and by
ensuring that the necessary procedures and certifications are in place. Coordinating adoption across
aircraft operators can result in quicker benefit realization where there are strong network effects
such as at airports where commercial airline traffic accounts for the vast majority of operations.
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Figure 9: Relative timing of costs and benefits
Figure 10 illustrates the appropriate leverage strategies for three general cases of value delivery
over time. We assume that the long-term value of equipping to aircraft operators is positive. In the
first case costs and benefits coincide, or benefits are realized rapidly. This scenario occurs when
individual adoptions provide immediate benefits. For example, the traffic and weather information
services bundled with ADS-B for general aviation users are intended to be immediately available
on installation of the necessary equipage. Similarly, aircraft that equipped for RVSM were
immediately able to make use of new flight levels in certain air sectors. In the case where benefits
are significant relative to cost, aircraft operators should have sufficient incentive to invest without
the need for additional schemes. When benefits are immediately realized but are significantly
smaller than costs over the short term, additional incentives such as service discounts or financing
schemes may be needed.
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Figure 10: Leverage strategies according to value delivery over time
In the second case costs precede benefits but benefits are still realized in the medium term2. This
scenario can occur when there are benefit network effects or when there is a delay in ground
infrastructure deployment relative to aircraft equipage adoption. When initial benefits are low,
                                                      
2 The definition of ‘medium’ and ‘long’ term is somewhat subjective. The principal difference between the
medium and long term cases is the extent of leverage necessary.
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financial incentive schemes may be necessary to overcome the short-term negative value of
equipping. When the delay in benefit realization is due to a projected delay in ground infrastructure
deployment, accelerating the deployment should also be evaluated (e.g., practicality, cost) as a way
of improving value delivery over time
In the third case, there is a long delay on the order of years before benefits are realized. This
scenario occurs when there are strong network benefit effects or when there is a long delay to the
necessary ground infrastructure deployment. For example, ADS-B does not offer a significant
benefit to commercial airlines unless a majority of aircraft flying in a particular region is equipped.
However, when benefits take this long to be realized aggressive strategies are needed to delay costs
or accelerate benefit realization. Pioneer schemes should be used to demonstrate value and to gain
a foothold in the aviation community. Aggressive positive incentives may be needed to delay or
offset costs and encourage initial adoption so that benefit network effects become significant.
Region-selective mandates coupled with aggressive ground infrastructure deployment can be used
to simultaneously force and encourage adoption. When benefits take this long to be realized it may
also be an indication that the equipage is not the most appropriate solution or that additional
applications for the equipage should be considered.
As an aside, note that the mix of aircraft ages in an operator’s fleet may affect the operator’s
willingness to cooperate with adopting new equipage. If the fleet is composed largely of old
aircraft the operator may be reluctant to equip. In such cases equipage mandates can be selectively
applied based on aircraft age or time to retirement. Mandating equipage on new aircraft is likely to
be less contentious as forward fitting is cheaper than retrofitting and allows aircraft operators to
avoid costly downtimes for equipage installation. Operators with a mixed fleet of older and newer
aircraft present the most challenging problem. In this case relying solely on forward fit is
infeasible. Since aircraft service lifetimes in the United States are currently about thirty years, it
can decades for the entire fleet to turn over. Maintaining both old and new systems in this case
(e.g., radar and ADS-B) may be excessively costly for the aviation agency. Selective retrofitting of
newer aircraft therefore becomes essential to program success. The threshold aircraft age for
retrofitting is determined by the desired date at which the transition to the new technology is to be
complete.
4 ADS-B Value and Leverage Strategy Analysis
ADS-B adoption in the United States has not proceeded at the pace initially hoped for by the FAA.
We show using the value analysis approach developed in Section 2 that the reluctance of aircraft
operators can be explained in terms of value imbalances. Next, we use the leverage strategy
selection framework developed in Section 3 to develop a strategy for encouraging adoption of
ADS-B by both commercial airlines and general aviation operators.
4.1 Overview of Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B)
ADS-B is a system for monitoring and transmitting an aircraft’s identification, position, altitude,
airspeed and intent (whether the aircraft is turning, climbing or descending) to air traffic controllers
and to other aircraft. The system uses global positioning satellites (GPS) to determine aircraft
position, and ground stations or satellites to transmit this information to air traffic control centers or
other aircraft.
ADS-B offers safety and performance benefits because aircraft position and other dynamic data can
be determined more accurately and more frequently than with current radar systems. In en-route
and approach traffic the more accurate and timely ADS-B data allows air traffic controllers to
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space aircraft more closely and thus increase airspace capacity. Currently uncertainty about aircraft
positions results in separations far greater than the minimum permitted separation, thus decreasing
airspace capacity. In the future, if safety concerns are resolved, aircraft may also be able to ‘self-
separate’ using cockpit displays of ADS-B traffic information. Self-separation decreases controller
workload and also increases airspace capacity by allowing decreased spacing between aircraft.
During final approach, ADS-B can enable more closely spaced parallel approaches and enhanced
visual approaches. The eventual goal is to allow visual meteorological conditions (VMC) like
approaches even in adverse weather conditions that would otherwise require instrument
meteorological conditions (IMC) approaches. These features will increase the capacity of ADS-B
equipped airports. Lastly, ADS-B can also be used on airport surfaces to improve traffic
management and reduce runway incursions.
4.1.1 ADS-B System Architecture
The ADS-B system consists of ground stations and on-board equipage and also uses GPS and other
satellite services, as shown in Figure 11. Aircraft position and dynamics data are obtained from
GPS and on-board instruments, respectively. These data are transmitted to air traffic control ground
stations or communications satellites or directly to other ADS-B equipped aircraft. This capability
is referred to as ADS-B out. Communications satellites are proposed for use in regions that are not
equipped with ground stations, such as oceanic and sparsely populated regions. Aircraft that are
equipped with display units such as a cockpit display of traffic information (CDTI) unit or an
electronic flight bag (EFB) can display ADS-B data from other aircraft as well as traffic
information services (TIS-B) and flight information services (FIS-B) from air traffic control
centers. This capability is referred to as ADS-B in.
On-board transceiver
(1090 or UAT)
Display unit
(CDTI or EFB)
GPS
Receiver
Aircraft Avionics for ADS-B
Ground Station
(1090 or UAT or both)
GPS Constellation
TIS-B
FIS-B
Communications
Satellites
Aircraft Instruments
Other
Aircraft
Application Processor
Figure 11: ADS-B system block diagram
ADS-B ground stations are expected to cost about one third as much as the radar stations currently
used to track aircraft. Maintenance for these stations is also expected to be cheaper because unlike
the rotating radar ground stations ADS-B ground stations do not require moving parts.
4.1.2 ADS-B Datalink Selection
One important and somewhat contentious aspect of ADS-B is the link configuration that is used to
transmit ADS-B data. Several link configurations are under consideration for ADS-B. In the United
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States the 1090 MHz Mode-S extended squitter has been selected as the standard for commercial
aircraft. This link configuration can be used by modifying existing Mode-S transmitters. These
transmitters are required on all commercial aircraft for use in the traffic collision avoidance system
(TCAS). In order to ensure compatibility, Eurocontrol has also selected this link configuration.
There are concerns however that this link will become congested in high-traffic areas in the next
ten years [Evans, 2004]. This period is well within the lifetime of many in-service aircraft.
However, there do not appear to be any precise estimates of when this congestion will occur. This
lack of certainty about the future performance of the selected datalink is one of the problems in
constructing a cost-benefit case for ADS-B (see section 4.2.3).
A second data link, which uses the relatively inexpensive Universal Access Transceiver (UAT), has
been selected for private and non-commercial aviation in the United States. This link has been
implemented by UPS Aviation Technologies and installed on up to 200 aircraft as part of the
successful FAA Capstone ADS-B demonstration program in Alaska. Included in this link definition
is the option to transmit traffic and flight information services such as weather data. This type of
information is currently not available on most general aviation aircraft and is an added benefit for
adopting ADS-B.
A third link configuration, VHF Datalink (VDL) Mode 4 is being proposed by Swedish and
Russian authorities but is currently not supported by the FAA or Eurocontrol. VDL Mode 4 has
been proposed as a replacement for 1090 MHz Mode-S when this datalink becomes congested. But
while 1090 MHz Mode-S and UAT operate in a similar frequency range and can therefore use the
same antenna, VLD Mode 4 operates in a different frequency range and converting would therefore
require the addition of a new antenna in addition to other equipage upgrades.
The different link standards are not compatible. Aircraft using different standards cannot
communicate directly with each other and ground stations required dual/triple capability to
interface with aircraft of each type. Some manufacturers are making two-media (UAT/1090) units
to allow aircraft to communicate using either or both bands.
4.2 ADS-B Stakeholder and Value Analysis
Table 1 summarizes the high level United States aviation industry stakeholders and their needs
(with input from [Carlock and Decker, 1998]).
Table 1: ADS-B Stakeholders
Stakeholder Needs
Public Affordable transportation
Convenient flight times
Few delays
Safety
Comfort
Commercial Airlines Collaborative decision-making and information sharing
Flexible routing
Predictable scheduling
Increased capacity at lower cost
General Aviation Low-cost services
Low-cost equipage
Minimum restrictions
Military No changes that result in high retrofit costs
Positive control of special-use airspace
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Stakeholder Needs
Airports Sufficient capacity to serve surrounding communities and aircraft operators
Airport Communities Reduced noise and emissions
Equipage and Airframe
Manufacturers
FAA strategic acquisition planning information
Faster certification of new equipage and technologies
Increased sales of products
Domestic Aviation
Agencies
Safe and efficient work environments by regulatory side
Productivity enhancing tools by service delivery side
International Aviation
Agencies
Compatible standards, international cooperation
Ideally, the overriding concern with any technology transition is to bring value to the majority of
stakeholders. In aviation, it is also required that technology transitions do not compromise safety.
The values, needs and constraints of all stakeholders must be considered when designing and
implementing any such efforts. We therefore begin the value analysis by looking at the value of
ADS-B to the major stakeholders. Next, we focus on ways of obtaining the cooperation of
commercial airlines and general aviation stakeholder groups in technology transition efforts.
4.2.1 ADS-B Value to Public
ADS-B is one of a number of programs aimed at improving airport and airspace capacity as well as
safety. Strong arguments have been made that growth in commercial air transportation is not
merely correlated with economic growth but may actually enable a significant proportion of
economic growth [e.g., NASA/FAA, 2003]. If these arguments are valid, then any technology that
increases airspace capacity has the potential to encourage economic growth, provided that
transition costs do not exceed overall benefits. ADS-B therefore provides benefit to the public if it
provides the anticipated increase in capacity and if it shows overall positive value. The relative
effectiveness and efficiency of ADS-B, as opposed to other approaches, in increasing airspace
capacity and safety must also be determined. These questions can be answered by technical
modeling and financial analysis.
4.2.2 ADS-B Value to Aviation Agencies
ADS-B offers two main types of benefits to aviation agencies. First, by potentially increasing
safety, airspace capacity, and airspace traffic monitoring coverage it helps aviation agencies to
fulfill their missions to enable safe and efficient use of their respective airspaces. Second, it allows
aviation agencies to avoid some of the substantial costs of operating and maintaining radar
monitoring of air traffic. A smaller and more unclear benefit is potential staff savings resulting
from decreased controller workload.
Table 2: ADS-B benefits to aviation agencies
Value Category
Safety benefits Reduced mid-air collisions
Reduced runway incursions
Performance benefits Increased airspace and airport capacity
Tracking outside radar coverage
Avoided costs Radar purchase and maintenance
Navaid replacement and maintenance
Improved air traffic
control efficiency
Marginal staff savings
18
control efficiency
The value of ADS-B to the FAA has been quantified to some extent. Figure 12 shows one estimate
of the total cost that the FAA can potentially avoid by transitioning to ADS-B under the current
spiral development plan [Fontaine, 2005]. The first peak in the graph represents cost savings from
not replacing ageing radar ground stations. The steady-state cost savings result from decreased
maintenance costs and improved controller productivity, assuming that ADS-B is successfully
mandated in all airspace classes by 2019.
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Figure 12: FAA total avoided cost per year
Lower than assumed equipage rates could significantly alter the value of ADS-B to the FAA (and
to aircraft operators, see next section). For example, if equipage is not mandated and aircraft
operators are slow to equip it will be necessary to maintain radar ground stations. The cost of
maintaining old systems is highly dependent on how rapidly ADS-B is adopted and must be taken
into account when considering different adoption strategies. For example, relying on adoption
through forward-fit only will result in a long transition period and therefore high transition costs.
The total cost of maintaining these stations as well as new ADS-B ground stations may drive the
value of ADS-B down dramatically. Before further action is taken on ADS-B, the sensitivity of
costs and benefits to different adoption percentages should be calculated.
In the ideal scenario where ADS-B is adopted by a significant proportion of aircraft operators,
transitioning to ADS-B offers significant cost savings to the FAA. Consider now how ADS-B
appears from aircraft operators’ perspectives.
4.2.3 ADS-B Value to Commercial Airlines
The transition to ADS-B will not be successful if ADS-B is not installed on a significant proportion
of commercial airliners. It is therefore necessary to understand what shapes airlines’ perception of
the benefits and costs of ADS-B. Airlines will be reluctant to invest in equipage in general and
ADS-B in particular if they perceive the investment as having low or negative value. The primary
benefit to commercial aviation of equipping with ADS-B is the potential for reduced delays in en-
route and terminal airspace. Reduced delays result in fuel savings and make faster turnarounds
possible, thus allowing improved aircraft utilization rates. The realization of this benefit relies on
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extensive equipage adoption among airlines (i.e., strong benefit network effects) but few airlines in
the United States are ADS-B equipped at present. ADS-B therefore offers little value except in
cases where an airline is a heavy user of an ADS-B equipped hub and can gain value from reduced
separation between its own aircraft and improved management of surface traffic. ADS-B is viewed
more favorably in areas where radar coverage is not available. For example, Australia is
implementing ADS-B coverage across the vast interior where there is currently no radar coverage.
In cases like this airlines have a clear incentive to invest.
As discussed in section 3.2, airlines are less likely to invest when benefits or costs are uncertain.
Currently available data on the costs and benefits of ADS-B in United States airspace to
commercial airlines is ambiguous and does not make a clear business case for investing. While the
benefit to the FAA is clear, the benefit to airlines is much less certain. Obtaining commercial
aviation cooperation in the transition effort requires first that clear data on the costs and benefits of
ADS-B be provided. In particular, the problem of 1090 MHz Mode-S datalink congestion within
the next ten to fifteen years must be studied and potential solutions must be developed. Datalink
congestion will limit the benefit lifetime and therefore shift the value of investing down.
Aviation agencies across the world have performed extensive analyses of the costs to aircraft
operators of equipping. See, for example, [Mitre, 2005] and [Fontaine, 2005]. Determining future
costs is part art, part science. Many assumptions must be made to work around uncertainties. For
example, the future costs of equipage may drop dramatically as economies of scale are realized.
Labor and downtime costs are also volatile. Cost estimates from different agencies and groups
therefore tend to differ. For example, the FAA and Eurocontrol cost studies provide different
figures; Yablonski Rurup et al. [2002] provide a useful discussion of these different approaches and
the different underlying assumptions.
There is little quantified data publicly available on the value of ADS-B benefits to individual
airlines, or on the value of equipping a single aircraft. Publicly available FAA studies indicate
substantial benefits to the US airline industry as a whole [Fontaine, 2005]. While these kinds of
studies do seem to indicate that there is a strong case for airlines to invest, they do not provide
sufficient resolution for individual airlines to make adoption decisions. The paucity of clearly
derived and publicly available data on the monetary value of benefits to airlines illustrates the
uncertainty surrounding ADS-B.
In summary, though we do not have access to sufficient data on ADS-B, it is clear that for
commercial airlines ADS-B shows strong benefit network effects relative to adoptions because
substantial adoption is required for delay reductions to become financially significant. Benefit
network effects relative to ground infrastructure are also quite significant because commercial
airlines tend to have large operating areas and benefits are therefore dependent on multiple ground
station deployments. In addition, because of the strong benefit network effects and because current
adoption rates are slow, airlines face a long delay between costs and benefits. For the FAA, the
primary benefit derives from cost reduction from operating fewer radars. In the next section we
discuss the appropriate leverage strategies for this situation.
4.2.4 ADS-B Value to General Aviation
In contrast to commercial aviation, the primary benefit of ADS-B to general aviation users is
improved safety through weather and traffic information services provided to equipped aircraft.
While the general aviation community views this benefit positively, it is concerned about the costs
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of equipping and about the possibility of equipage mandates in the short term3. Another concern is
the possibility that business jets may have to equip with both 1090 and UAT equipage because they
fly at high altitudes with commercial airlines and also into non-radar airfields with general aviation.
They may therefore have to expend double the equipage cost.
General aviation equipage costs per aircraft are substantially lower than those for commercial
aviation. See, for example [Mitre, 2005] and [Fontaine, 2005]. Nevertheless, the costs may still be
prohibitively high for many general aviation operators. To address this problem, the Australian air
traffic operator has convinced commercial airlines to pay the cost of equipping the general aviation
fleet in Australia [Evans, 2004].
The safety benefits to general aviation are clear and recognized by the general aviation community.
Because the safety benefits are immediately realized on individual adoptions, they have negligible
network effects relative to the number of adoptions and there is little delay between costs and
benefit realization. Benefit network effects relative to ground infrastructure deployment are also
weak because general aviation operators tend to have small ranges centered about one or two
airports. Benefits can therefore be immediately realized on equipage provided there is at least one
ground station in a particular operator’s operating area. The primary challenge with general
aviation is overcoming the equipage cost obstacle. In the next section we discuss the appropriate
leverage strategies for this situation.
4.2.5 ADS-B Value Distribution Summary
Figure 13 illustrates the notional value distribution of ADS-B benefits across key stakeholders.
Benefits are not mutually exclusive. For example, increased capacity can be seen as a result of
delay reduction, or vice versa. Aviation agencies stand to reap significant benefits from ADS-B, as
indicated by the dashed oval in the figure. Both commercial airlines and general aviation can also
reap significant benefits from ADS-B. However, the costs and uncertainties associated with these
benefits, and, in the case of commercial aviation, the delay to full benefit realization, make ADS-B
a less attractive investment opportunity.
                                                      
3 See, for example, AOPA’s stand on ADS-B.
[http://avweb.com/cgi-bin/udt/im.display.printable?client.id=avflash&story.id=191022]
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Figure 13: ADS-B benefit distribution across key stakeholders
Figure 14 illustrates the notional distribution of costs across key stakeholders. Costs are relative to
each stakeholder. For example, $5000 for equipage may be relatively cheap for a commercial
airliner but prohibitively expensive for a general aviation operator. The cost to the public is
indirectly realized through airline fares to recover general and federal taxes on airline tickets. Both
commercial airlines and general aviation operators must make relatively significant investments in
order to use ADS-B, as indicated by the dashed oval in the figure. In contrast, the investment
required from aviation agencies, and by extension the public, is much smaller.
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Figure 14: ADS-B cost distribution across key stakeholders
Figure 15 illustrates some of the notional benefits over time for key stakeholders. Benefits are not
to scale in the figure—our intent is to show the relative timing of benefits and costs (see Figure 16).
For aviation agencies and the public, the first benefit to be realized is cost avoidance arising from
deferred or cancelled radar station replacements. The benefits associated with increased capacity,
reduced delays, and improved air traffic control coverage accrue to the public, aviation agencies,
and commercial airlines, but take longer to realize. General aviation operators reap near immediate
safety and improved services (TIS-B and FIS-B) benefits.
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Figure 15: ADS-B benefits over time
Figure 16 illustrates the notional costs over time for key stakeholders. Again, costs are notional and
not to scale. Aviation agencies and the public by extension must make initial investment in ADS-B
ground infrastructure deployment and training. These costs are more than subsumed by the cost
savings resulting from deferred or cancelled radar installations. The public may also bear some of
the cost of ADS-B through increased air fares. As mentioned previously, commercial airlines and
general aviation operators must make significant upfront investments in equipage. For both ground
and airborne equipment, maintenance costs will persist throughout the lifetime of the system.
Maintenance costs for ADS-B ground stations are however expected to be significantly lower than
those for the FAA’s radar systems.
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Figure 16: ADS-B relative costs over time
4.3 ADS-B Leverage Strategy Selection
Internationally ADS-B appears to be moving forward. Commercial airlines are equipping to make
use of ADS-B stations in European and Australian airspace. General aviation stakeholders are
enthusiastic about the safety benefits of ADS-B but are reluctant to endorse ADS-B strongly
because of fear of user fees or exclusion from certain airports or airspace regions and the cost of
equipping. Commercial airlines are reluctant because a lack of data means there is still no clear
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business case. The value analysis in the preceding section has shown that there are significant
imbalances in the distribution of costs and benefits across stakeholders and over time. In particular,
there is uncertainty about the value of adopting ADS-B and the potential for the 1090 Mode-S
datalink to become congested and unusable in the near future. This section shows how these
imbalances can be reduced or circumvented by means of appropriate strategies.
4.3.1 Commercial Aviation
Commercial airlines derive ADS-B benefits primarily from the increase in airspace and airport
capacity. To derive these benefits a threshold level of ground infrastructure deployment and
equipage adoption is required. The appropriate strategies in this case include proactive ground
infrastructure deployment, pioneer schemes to obtain an initial foothold, financing schemes to
offset and delay initial costs and eventually mandates reap maximum benefit from benefit network
effects.
1. Infrastructure and Development Support
• Credible cost-benefit analyses
• Address 1090 congestion issue
• Extensive ground infrastructure deployment
2. Persuasive Technology Value
• Credible cost-benefit analyses
• Address 1090 congestion issue
3. Positive Incentives
• Pioneer schemes (e.g., Capstone in Alaska)
• Service discounts (n.a. in US)
• Preferential access
4. Mandates and Fees
• Forward fit mandates followed by blanket 
mandates for selected airspace
• Eventual mandate across NAS
• Fees for non-equipped (n.a. in US)
Figure 17: Commercial aviation ADS-B Strategy
Figure 17 illustrates the derived strategy for encouraging ADS-B adoption by commercial airlines.
The first step is to provide development support and ground infrastructure deployment. Aviation
agencies can increase airline certainty of benefits by installing ground stations at major airports. In
particular, it is necessary to address the uncertainty surrounding benefits of ADS-B and in
particular the potential 1090 MHz Mode-S congestion problem.
The second step is to determine whether ADS-B offers persuasive value to airlines. Credible cost-
benefit analyses that are linked to specific aircraft types, routes, equipage options (ADS-B out vs.
ADS-B in), and that take the potential for datalink congestion into account are required for
considering investment decisions. The benefits of ADS-B can be increased by adding additional
applications. For example, runway incursions (RIs) are a significant and growing problem at
airports. ADS-B can be used to address this problem if ground vehicles are also equipped with
ADS-B.
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The third step involves developing positive incentives for equipping. Pioneer schemes such as the
Capstone program in Alaska have shown initial success. While the FAA financing structure makes
discounts for equipped aircraft impossible, other positive incentives such as preferential access to
airports and airspace for equipped aircraft can be considered. Such incentives may be controversial
however.
Finally, mandates must be implemented to ensure that the transition is complete and that operators
who have equipped realize the full benefits of ADS-B. Because forward fit costs are significantly
lower, the least contentious approach is to begin with forward fit mandates. Next, regional and
airport specific mandates should be implemented. Retrofit mandates are the final step in the
transition. In each appropriate deployment of ground infrastructure is essential to ensure airlines
can derive benefit from their equipage. The optimal timing of mandates depends on a number of
factors including current fleet age mixes, ground equipment time to obsolescence, and the scaling
of benefits with adoption levels. We leave the determination of optimal mandate timing for future
work.
4.3.2 General Aviation
General aviation operators and private pilots derive benefits primarily from the safety aspects of
ADS-B. Unlike commercial aviation, general aviation operators should have an immediate
incentive to invest because significant safety benefits which are relatively independent of benefit
network effects are realized immediately upon installation. However, the high cost of equipping
relative to average aircraft value is a limiting factor. In addition, fears about user fees (which are
easier to impose on ADS-B equipped aircraft) and exclusion from certain airports or airspace
regions make general aviation operators cautious about supporting ADS-B.
1. Infrastructure and Development Support
• Ground infrastructure deployment
• Address user fee and airport exclusion fears
2. Persuasive Technology Value
• Significant safety benefits
3. Positive Incentives
• Pioneer schemes (e.g., Capstone in Alaska)
• Service discounts (n.a. in US)
• Lower avionics cost
• Financial aid for equipping
4. Mandates and Fees
• Forward fit mandates followed by blanket 
mandates for selected airspace
• Eventual mandate across NAS
• Fees for non-equipped (n.a. in US)
Figure 18: General aviation ADS-B Strategy
Figure 17 illustrates the derived strategy for encouraging ADS-B adoption by general aviation
operators. As with commercial airlines, the first step is to provide development support and ground
infrastructure deployment. General aviation fears of user fees and of exclusion from airports must
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be addressed explicitly. While these questions remain unanswered general aviation stakeholder
groups such as AOPA may be expected to dissuade their members from equipping. The second
step, demonstrating persuasive technology values, is satisfied by the safety benefits offered by
ADS-B.
The high relative cost of equipping can be addressed in several ways. First, progress in the
technology and competition between manufacturers have already decreased the cost of equipage to
about $7800 today [Wood, 2005]. Economies of scale may also result in a further decrease in cost.
Second, the FAA could partially or completely subsidies the cost of equipage. This approach is
being advocated in Australia where commercial airlines have been persuaded to subsidies general
aviation operators’ equipage through service fees [Evans, 2004]. Partial subsidies should also be
considered.
The final step, mandates, must be carefully managed. As discussed above, general aviation fears of
exclusion from airports must be addressed. For example, mandating ADS-B at a given airport may
be less contentious if a nearby airport does not have such a mandate. It may be necessary to
maintain some radar coverage at selected airports and as a safety backup.
5 Conclusions
We have proposed an approach to developing appropriate strategies to persuade stakeholders to
participate in technology transitions. By analyzing stakeholder values, the distribution of equipage
value (costs and benefits) across stakeholders, and the distribution of value over time, appropriate
strategies can be determined. Technologies that may show an overall positive value can
nevertheless not provide value to individual stakeholders. Such imbalances in value distribution
lead to stakeholder intransigence and can stymie efforts to transform systems. Leverage strategies
that correct these imbalances and accelerate the realization of value for all stakeholders can
enhance cooperation and increase the likelihood of a successful transition to the new technology.
We showed how value distribution across stakeholders and over time can be used to determine
appropriate policy strategies. We illustrated the use of the approach in the case of ADS-B adoption.
The approach is also applicable to a wide range of industries beyond aviation, such as the energy
sector and telecommunications.
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